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Abstract
We examine the impact of including sustainability related con-
straints on optimal portfolio selection. Our analysis covers an invest-
ment set containing the components of the S&P500 index from 1993
to 2008. The optimizations are performed according to the classi-
cal mean-variance approach while sustainability constraints are intro-
duced by eliminating from the investment pool those assets that do
not comply to given social responsibility criteria (screening). We com-
pare the e±cient frontiers with and without screening. The analysis is
performed on the three main dimensions of sustainability, namely En-
vironmental, Social and Governance. We ¯nd that socially responsible
screening implies a small loss in terms of Sharpe Ratio even though it
has a strong impact on the market capitalization of the optimal port-
folio. The spanning test shows that the ex-post di®erences between
the two frontiers, when short selling is not allowed, are signi¯cant only
in the case of Environmental screening.
Keywords: Socially responsible investments; optimal portfolios;
screening
Jel Classi¯cation: G10; G11
11 Introduction
Investment choices based on Socially Responsible (SR) criteria are assuming
a greater relevance in today ¯nancial markets, both in terms of asset under
management and of number of investors. Often, a SR portfolio strategy is
implemented by eliminating from the investment universe those companies
that are perceived as having weaknesses in at least one of the three dimen-
sions that commonly de¯ne the social responsible realm. This procedure is
called "screening" and can be implemented in di®erent ways, depending on
the emphasis put by the investor on di®erent type of concerns, and on the
depth (as percentage of the total number of assets or of market value) of the
screening. The issues of concern are commonly classi¯ed under three main
areas: Environmental (E), Social (S) and Governance (G), the so-called
\three dimensions of SR".
What is the impact of di®erent screening policies on the investment set?
How strong are its e®ects in terms of capitalization? Reducing the investment
set might diminish the expected (risk-adjusted) returns, but just how big is
the incurred loss? Do the e®ects of screening change with time or are they
relatively stable? Does screening based on some of the SR dimensions have
stronger e®ects for the investor? How do such e®ects depend on the level of
screening and/or the level of risk that the investor is willing to bear?
These are relevant questions for any portfolio manager or researcher with
an interest in socially responsible investment. Quoting Kurtz (1997) we can
state that: \one of the most important questions, still unanswered about
SR investment is: What does the e±cient frontier for a socially responsible
investor look like, and what does it imply for asset allocation?" This paper is
an attempt to provide an answer to these questions based on an investment
exercise performed on an universe comprising an almost exhaustive subset of
S&P500 ¯rms and stretching on a sixteen year period from 1993 to 2008. We
study how constraints based on the KLD sustainability scores a®ect port-
folio choices in the classical mean-variance optimization framework. More
concretely, we perform a quarterly comparison between the e±cient frontier
1corresponding to the whole investment universe and those corresponding to
smaller universes where ¯rms with poor sustainability scores were removed.
Earlier studies (such as Kinder and Domini 1997), compared the perfor-
mance of SR indexes (like the Domini Social Index) to conventional ones
(for example S&P500), reporting, in many cases, favorable results for SR
screening1. After Kurtz (1997) observed that such approaches were °awed
by the fact that they did not take into account di®erences in investment
styles, namely capitalization, price to book ratios and dividends, the use
of three (or four) factor models became a standard for this kind of anal-
ysis and a certain consensus on the ¯ndings started to emerge. Stone at
al. (2001) studied the impact of SR screening on managed portfolios in the
US equity market adopting the SR rating provided by KLD and found no
signi¯cant di®erences between SR and not SR returns. Bauer et al. (2005)
found, after controlling for the investment style, no evidence of signi¯cant
di®erences in risk-adjusted returns between ethical and conventional funds
for the 1990-2001 period. Statman and Glushkov (2009) analyzed returns
on US stocks rated by KLD during 1992-2007 and found no evidence that
socially responsible investors had a return advantage relative to conventional
investors2. Amenc and Le Sourd (2008) analyzed the performances of sixty-
two SR funds in the period 2002-2007 by computing their alpha with respect
to the Fama-French model. In most of the cases they found a null or neg-
ative alpha, indicating that the SR funds did not create any value beyond
that predicted by their respective exposures to the style factors. It seems
hence relatively safe to state that the general consensus is that, after taking
1No general consensus on the e®ects of SR screening on ¯nancial returns exists in the
early studies, some of them reporting a positive e®ect, others a neutral or even a negative
one.
2More precisely, they observed that active screening, i.e. longing companies with pos-
itive ranking and shorting those with negative ranking, may induce some positive e®ects
on returns, while passive screening only induces negative e®ects. The sum of the two
strategies is usually null or slightly negative. Hence they concluded that for a SR manager
it is important to perform some form of active screening of securities.
2into account the speci¯city of the investment styles, the di®erences between
the returns on SR instruments and conventional ones, both expected and
realized, tend to vanish.
The vast majority of the literature on SR investment, and all of the above
cited papers in particular, compares the returns of either singular assets, or
of actively or passively managed portfolios, usually after accounting for the
e®ects due to investment styles. Our paper extends hence the existing liter-
ature by a dynamical analysis of the e®ect of SR screening on the optimal
mean variance allocation process. While the previous literature uses exist-
ing investment instruments, we construct ourselves the investment portfolios,
mimicking a real-life situation faced by a portfolio manager that has to im-
plement SR constraints in her investment policy. We construct and compare
on a quarterly basis the e±cient frontiers corresponding to an investment
universe with and without SR screening. We analyze the time evolution of
the \price of sustainability", de¯ned as the loss in the Sharpe ratio due to
shrinking of the investment set, for the three sustainability dimensions and
for di®erent levels of risk and of screening. We ¯nd that the \price of sus-
tainability" is strongly related to the loss in capitalization3 but also that it
is surprisingly small comparing to the size of the 'screened' market value:
an \all-concern" screening, that eliminates all the companies that raise even
a single issue of concern (and that corresponds to more than 60% of the
market capitalization) decreases the Sharpe ratio by no more than 7% for
a medium level of risk. At the same level of risk, the screening of the 10%
of the companies with the worst performance in the social issues, produces
a loss in Sharpe Ratio of 0.5%, on average, corresponding to a loss of mar-
ket capitalization that is around 30% (for details see Section 5). Di®erent
tests show that the di®erence in Sharpe Ratio between an unrestricted port-
folio and a screened one is never signi¯cant ex-post, independently from the
3We ¯nd that companies with a higher capitalization raise more \Social" concerns. For
this reason, the S dimension is usually the one that produces a major loss in terms of
capitalization, for any level of screening. This is the main reason why screening based on
the S dimension has usually a stronger impact than other kinds of screening.
3screening policy adopted and the level of risk considered. The spanning test
is also performed to determine if the e±cient frontier built on our responsible
portfolios enhances signi¯catively when the unrestricted portfolios are added
to the investment set. The test shows that the inclusion of conventional
portfolios may improve the investment opportunities by diversi¯cation, but
only when short-selling is allowed or, without short-selling, in the case of the
environmental screening.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we formalize the opti-
mization problem and we introduce our measure of the cost of sustainability.
Section 3 is devoted to the estimation of the input, namely the covariance
matrices and the expected returns. Section 4 is a description of the KLD
data set that we used. In Section 5 we describe the screening policies ana-
lyzed and we report our main ¯ndings on the cost of sustainability and on
the impact of screening on market capitalization. Several statistical tests are
considered in Section 6, including a robustness test to the input estimation
errors, some tests for the di®erence of ex-post Sharpe Ratio of unscreened
and screened portfolios, and the spanning test for the di®erence between
e±cient frontiers. Moreover we compare the result of the socially responsi-
ble screening with the case in which screening is performed according to a
random selection. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 The Price of Sustainability
In this section we formalize the optimization problem and propose a measure
for the impact of screening on the optimal portfolios. We consider a set of N
assets and denote their rates of return at time t by Ri
t;i = 1;:::;N. Let § be
their covariance matrix and ¹ the vector of expected returns. The optimal
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where w is a N-vector of portfolio weights, L is a parameter indicating the
minimum level of acceptable expected return, (2.3) is a balance constraint
and (2.4) is the short-selling constraint.
Screening is the most straightforward way to introduce SR constraints
in a portfolio choice. Companies not complying with given SR requirements
are simply removed from the investment universe. Hence, for any invest-
ment instance, this approach yields two portfolios: the optimal \screened"
portfolio, obtained by solving the allocation problem over the restrained in-
vestment universe and the optimal \reference" portfolio obtained by solving
the allocation problem over the whole investment universe.
Let ¼(L) be the ratio between the Sharpe Ratios of the optimal \screened"
portfolio and of the optimal \reference" portfolio, for a level of expected
return L. Note that ¼(L) is always positive and smaller than or equal to 1.
We de¯ne the sustainability price for a level L of expected return as
p(L) = 1 ¡ ¼(L): (2.5)
This quantity measures the relative Sharpe Ratio loss due to SR screening.
We focus our analysis on three levels of minimum expected returns (three
di®erent values of the parameter L), associated to three di®erent levels of
risk. The ¯rst one is the expected return of the global minimum variance
(GMV) portfolio, which we will refer to as L1. Since we want to compare
portfolios on di®erent frontiers at the same level of expected return, the level
L1 is set as the highest expected return among the GMV portfolios for all the
5frontiers considered. The second value L2 corresponds to the market level of
expected return and represents a medium level of risk. The third value L3
corresponds to the highest level of risk considered and it is chosen such that
L2 is the average between this return and L1. Note that the values of L1;L2
and L3 depend on the parameters of the distribution of the returns ¹ and §.
3 Model calibration
In this section we explain how we obtain the inputs of the allocation problem
(2.1)-(2.4), that is the covariance matrix § and the vector of expected returns
¹. To estimate § we adopt the Fama and French model (see Fama and French
(1992) and (1993)) as it is one of the most popular factor models:
R
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where RFt is the risk free return, RM
t is the return of the market portfolio,
SMBt is the return of the small minus big market capitalization factor and
HMLt is the return of the high minus low book to market value ratio factor.
The ²i
t are the usual i.i.d idiosyncratic error terms with zero mean. The
coe±cient ®i represents the extra expected return of the i-th company that
is not directly explained by the sensitivities to the factors. Using vector
notation, (3.6) can be written as
Rt ¡ RFt = ® + ¯ft + ²t; t = 1;2;:::;T
where Rt is N £1 matrix of returns, ® is N £1 matrix, ¯ is the N £3 matrix
of loading factors, ft is a 3 £ 1 matrix of factor returns and ²t is a N £ 1
matrix of errors which implies that
§ = ¯V ar(f)¯
0 + V ar(²): (3.7)
In a ¯rst step we estimated the factor loadings ¯1;¯2;¯3 by regressing
the excess returns of single companies on the mentioned risk factors4. We
4The time series of the risk factors come from K. R. French's web site
6re-estimated the model every three months between 1993 and 2008, using
monthly data on a window with length of 5 years.
In a second step, the variances in equation (3.7) were estimated by the
corresponding sample versions under the assumption that the variance of the
error term is well approximated by a diagonal matrix, i.e. the idiosyncratic
terms are uncorrelated.
We do not estimate the expected returns ¹ from the time series of the
asset returns but we make a market neutral forecasting assumption and we
set
¹ = RF + ¸§w
mkt (3.8)
where wmkt is the N-dimensional vector of the relative market capitalizations,
that is its i-th component is the ratio between the market capitalization of the
i-th company and the total capitalization of the market and ¸ is equal to the
ratio of the expected excess return of the market portfolio and its variance.
This is a common way to avoid the pitfalls of statistical estimation of the
expected returns, a notoriously di±cult issue, adopted, for example, as the
starting point of the popular Black-Litterman model (Black and Litterman
1992) 5. Since a change in ¸ re-scales the excess returns without a®ecting
the e±cient portfolios and their variances, the price of sustainability p(L)
de¯ned by (2.5) does not depend on ¸.
4 Social responsibility criteria
This section provides a description of the data set used. KLD Research
and Analytics, Inc. rates the social responsibility of US companies in seven
areas: Corporate Governance, Community, Diversity, Employee Relations,
Environmental, Human Rights, Products. For each of these areas, KLD
produces a number of indicators that come, each, in two °avors: \strength"
and \concern". The values these indicators take are 1 or 0. While a point
5Their proposers argued that "...the only neutral means is the set of expected returns
that would clear the market if all the investors had identical views".
7in a given strength indicator means that the company has a meritorious
behavior with respect to the criterion in question, a value of 1 in a concern
indicator signals a weakness of the company relative to the criterion related to
that indicator. A score of zero indicates that the company has not quali¯ed
neither for a strength nor for a concern. In addition to the seven major
area already mentioned, KLD provides also negative ratings on controversial
business issues like Alcohol, Gambling, Firearms, Military, Nuclear Power
and Tobacco.
KLD's database is organized in annual spreadsheets. From 1991 to 2000
KLD research covered approximately 650 companies belonging to the Domini
400 Social Index and/or to the S&P500 index. From 2001 KLD expanded
its coverage to include the largest 1000 US companies by market capitaliza-
tion while from 2003, KLD provides ratings for the largest 3000 US ¯rms.
The sustainability ratings are constructed on the basis of company's public
information, corporate social responsibility reporting and other information
obtained through direct engagement with the company (if there is any). The
scores, re°ecting the year's performance, are published in the month of Jan-
uary of the following year. In our analysis the ¯rst portfolio allocation of
each year is done in the beginning of the month of March. In this way we
make sure that the KLD data set containing the sustainability scores of the
previous year has been already released. For our analysis we consider KLD
data from 1992 to 2007 and consequently portfolio allocation from 1993 to
2008.
5 Empirical analysis
5.1 Data aggregation and screening
We start this section by describing how we processed the KLD data. For
every ¯rm covered, we aggregated the strength indicators and, separately,
the concern indicators for each of the seven sustainability areas mentioned
8in the beginning of section 4. The aggregation was done by summing up
all the indicators and dividing by the number of indicators involved. Then
we aggregated the newly created indicators of the seven areas in the three
classical dimensions of Environmental, Social and Governance. Since two of
the seven sustainability areas are identi¯ed as Environment and Corporate
Governance, the Social dimension, was obtained from the aggregation of the
remaining 5 areas.
At the end of this procedure each company has both a strength and a
concern score, standardized between 0 and 1, for each of the three macro-
dimensions.
The returns for the companies considered in the optimization exercise
were downloaded from Datastream6. For each investment exercise we kept
only those companies for which there was a series of returns su±ciently long
(at least 5 years) to estimate the covariance matrix. We also deleted from
our set those ¯rms that were not identi¯able when matching the data of
KLD and of Datastream7. After pre-processing the data an average of 470
companies per year were left in the sample, with around 460 companies for
the ¯rst years and around 490 for the more recent years. The percentage of
the market value lost with respect to the market value of the S&P500 index
was 5% on average.
Let us describe now the screening process applied to the investment uni-
verse. The screening procedures have been applied separately to each di-
mension following two di®erent approaches. The ¯rst approach, called "all-
concern screening", removes from the universe of investments all those com-
panies that raised at least one concern in the considered dimension. We will
see below (Section 5.2 and Figure 1) that this type of screening is very costly
both in terms of loss of market value as well as in terms of number of compa-
nies discarded. For our analysis it has the additional drawback that the size
6The data type used is \RI" that takes into account also for the dividends, assuming
that dividends are re-invested.
7KLD identi¯es companies by the CUSIP code only since 1995, before that year it used
just names, while Datastream adopts ISIN codes.
9of the investment set changes from year to year. Another point worth notic-
ing is that whole industries might be excluded from the investment universe:
for example, an \all-concern screening" along the E dimension will probably
eliminate most of the companies in the Technology or Oil & Gas sectors.
The second approach we applied is a \partial screening" in which one
eliminates from the investment universe a ¯xed given percentage of the com-
panies in each industrial sector8. This approach keeps the size of the in-
vestment set constant. It has the advantage of preserving the diversi¯cation
across industrial sectors.
We consider three di®erent percentages for the \partial screening": 10%,
30% and 50% of companies were eliminated. For each of the sustainability
criteria we sort the ¯rms on the basis of their concern scores. Companies
with a high number of concerns are at the bottom of the list and are the ¯rst
to be eliminated. If there is a tie in the number of concerns, we eliminate
the companies with the smaller number of strengths. This procedure takes
into account both concerns and strengths and yields a set of allocation of
the same size over the whole time period under study. It is designed to yield
a screened investment universe that has the same composition, in terms of
industrial sectors, as the whole market.
5.2 E®ects of screening on market value and the sus-
tainability prices
We start by examining the e®ect of screening on the investment universe.
Figure 1 shows the market capitalization percentage eliminated (top panel)
and the number of ¯rms remaining (bottom panel) for \all-concern" screening
along the three di®erent dimensions of sustainability. The ¯gure shows that
such kind of screening can be extremely invasive. Screening along the S or
G dimensions removes in recent years around 80% of S&P500 companies and
8The sectors considered are: Basic Materials, Consumer Goods, Consumer Services,
Financials, Healthcare, Industrials, Oil & Gas, Technology, Telecommunications, Utilities.
10almost 90% of market capitalization. The e®ect of screening based on the E
scores is di®erent: it appears to be constant through time and produces a
loss of market capitalization of around 40%.
Figure 2 shows the market value percentage eliminated by partial screen-
ing, for di®erent levels of screening. We observe that the e®ect of partial
screening in terms of market value loss is slightly increasing with time, with
screening along the Social dimension usually having a stronger impact.
A 10% screening eliminates up to 20% of market capitalization, while a
50% screening eliminates up to 70% for S dimension and 50% for E and G
dimensions.
Next we discuss the results of the portfolio optimization exercise. Table
1 reports the mean and the 95-th percentile of the distribution (quarterly
observations from 1993 to 2008) of the price of sustainability expressed as
a percentage. Screening is implemented for the main dimensions of sus-
tainability separately (E;S;G) and for three di®erent portfolios L1, L2, L3,
corresponding to di®erent classes of risk. This table provides an indication of
the amount of Sharpe ratio loss due to di®erent kind of screening, at di®er-
ent risk levels and along di®erent sustainability dimensions. For example, an
investor who plans to adopt a 10% screening on the environmental dimension
at the lowest possible risk (L1) must be prepared to loose on average 1.5%
of the Sharpe ratio but, if she is unlucky (95% percentile), the loss can be as
big as 3.6%. Her possible loss decreases if she is willing to take on more risk
choosing the levels L2 or L3. We note that the loss increases with the level
of screening, but it remains relatively low for almost all cases (even at a 50%
or all-concerns screening). Screening along the social dimension is usually
more costly in terms of loss of Sharpe ratio than the other two. The loss is
usually greater and more volatile for portfolios of type L19.
The time evolution of the sustainability prices p(L) corresponding to the
9As we will argue in Subsection 6.1, the results for portfolio L1 are a®ected by stronger
estimation errors and are not always signi¯cant. For this reason we prefer to restrict the
discussion to portfolios of type L2 and L3.
11L2 level of returns for \all-concern screening" and for 10% screening (the two
extremes of the screening level) are displayed in Figures 3 and 4 respectively.
For the \all-concern screening" we see that screening along the E dimension
produces the smallest drop in the Sharpe ratio: smaller than 1:3% in 95% of
cases. Screening along the G and S dimensions can cause maximal reductions
of at most 5:1% and 6:4%, respectively. These numbers seem remarkably low,
if one considers that the market capitalization loss can be as large as 90%.
The overall picture emerging from the analysis, that also includes some
results not represented in the paper, is that of a hierarchy in the percentage of
Sharpe ratio loss due to screening based on sustainability scores independently
on the level of screening with screening along the Social dimension being the
most penalizing while that along the Environmental one the least. Screening
on Governance scores yields a reduction of the Sharpe ratio closer to that of
the S (E) screening for higher (lower) levels of screening.
We also note that portfolios with the L2 risk level are a®ected by a smaller
drop in the Sharpe ratio. Sustainability prices for L2 and L3 levels of risk
are slightly increasing during the whole period.
6 Statistical Tests
This section presents some statistical tests on the results presented above.
The ¯rst test is on the robustness of the sustainability prices with respect to
variations in input data. Then we examine if discharging assets because of a
rule based on KLD ratings produces signi¯cantly di®erent results, in terms of
the impacts on market capitalization and on sustainability price, from those
obtained by a rule based on random exclusions. The third and the fourth
tests compare the ex-post performances of the optimal portfolio choices at
the risk levels L1;L2;L3 and for di®erent levels of screening.
126.1 Robustness
Here we study the robustness of the sustainability price with respect to varia-
tions of the e±cient frontiers due to estimation errors. The e±cient frontiers
depend on the estimated covariance matrices, that is on the loading factors
computed by the regressions. One possible way to assess the robustness of
our measures is therefore to consider the asymptotic distribution of the load-
ing factors as estimated by regression (3.6) and then to simulate new values
for them. From the simulated values of beta we recompute a new covariance
matrix as in (3.7) and a new vector of expected returns as in (3.8), then we
perform a new optimization. Repeating such procedure a number of times
gives us a con¯dence interval for the sustainability prices. Figure 6 shows
the results of this straightforward (but computationally intensive) approach
to the case of 10% E-screening for the last month of allocation (December
2008). The three bars correspond to the simulated distribution of the loss
of Sharpe ratio for the three levels of expected returns L1, L2 and L3. The
candles show the median and the 25-th and 75-th percentiles. Outliers are
represented as crossed points, while the circles indicate the loss of Sharpe
ratio measured for the three original portfolios, before resampling. It is ob-
vious that results are more robust with respect to the variability of input
estimates for portfolios L2 and L3, but very sensitive to the input estimates
for portfolio L1. Similar results apply also to other cases and make us be-
lieve that the high volatility of sustainability prices of portfolios L1 is due to
estimation error.
6.2 Random screening
Is there anything special about a screening based on SR criteria? What
happens when the same number of assets is eliminated following a di®erent
screening rule? To answer such questions we applied a procedure similar to
the \partial screening" described in Subsection 5.1 with the only di®erence
that the ¯rms were excluded from the investment set by a random choice
13and not because of poor KLD scores. We repeated this procedure, which we
called \random screening", 100 times for each year of the sample. Finally,
we computed the percentage of market capitalization and of Sharpe Ratio
lost after each \random screening" to compare them with the corresponding
quantities computed after the \partial screening" based on KLD scores on
the E, S, and G dimensions.
The results of the experiment are shown in Figure 5 for the case of the 10%
screening and risk level L2 . The bottom panel of Figure 5 represents, like the
top panel of Figure 2, the loss in Market Value for a 10% screening. However,
in this case such a loss is compared to the distribution of the random sample
(the candles show the median and the 25-th and 75-th percentiles). The
¯gure clearly shows that the losses in capitalization due to the S screening
(represented by crosses) are, for most of the years, higher than those produced
by the other two dimensions and than those due to random screening. Also
the losses due to E screening (represented by circles) are usually very high
compared to the random sample. The fact that screening according to the
S and E criteria eliminates such a relevant amount of market capitalization
is re°ected in the loss of Sharpe Ratio for the level L2, shown in the top
panel of Figure 5, that is the analogous to Figure 4 with the addition of the
distribution candles. Here we see that the losses due to S or E screening are
higher than most of those due to random screening. The G screening has a
lower impact on the loss of market value and, consequently, on the cost of
sustainability, although for the last years of the sample, it also produced a
few outliers.
6.3 Spanning test
The goal of this paper is to compare the mean-variance e±cient frontier cor-
responding to the unrestricted investment universe to that corresponding to
a smaller universe that excludes those assets that do not satisfy some sustain-
ability conditions. A spanning test, see Huberman and Kandel (1987) and De
Roon and Nijman (2001), is a statistical tool to check whether the di®erence
14between two frontiers is statistically signi¯cant or only due to sampling error.
The test tells if the e±cient frontier built on an investment universe changes
signi¯cantly when other assets are added to the investment pool. Spanning
test was previously used in Galema et al. (2009) to analyze the e®ect of so-
cially responsible investing on diversi¯cation. Due to the numerous instances
of testing resulting from the dynamic approach that we are advocating and
from working with di®erent screening rules, we will apply the spanning test
in a particular set-up that we now describe.
Let us consider a market with three so-called \conventional" assets plus
three so-called \sustainable" assets. The three \conventional" assets are the
e±cient portfolios computed over the whole investment universe for the three
levels of expected returns L1, L2 and L3, while the three \sustainable" assets
are the corresponding portfolios computed over the screened universe, for a
given level of screening and a given sustainability dimension10. We apply
the spanning test to answer the question whether the mean-variance frontier
of the \sustainable" assets remains e±cient when the investment opportu-
nities are increased to include also the \conventional" assets or, in other
words, whether adding the three \conventional" assets to the group of three
\sustainable" ones signi¯cantly enhances the opportunities of diversi¯cation.
In the standard framework of spanning test, one starts from an investment
universe with K risky assets to which one adds N assets. The ¯rst K assets
are usually called the benchmark assets while the additional N assets are
referred to as the test assets. In our case, the benchmark assets are the K = 3
portfolios optimized over the screened universe while the test ones are the
N = 3 e±cient portfolios computed over the whole investment universe for
the three levels of expected returns L1, L2 and L3. If there exists exactly one
portfolio for which investors cannot improve their opportunities, then the two
frontiers have only one point in common and we say that there is intersection.
If there are no improvement possibilities by adding the \conventional assets"
10The returns of such portfolios are in fact the returns of dynamic strategies (or managed
funds) re-balanced quarterly over the period considered.
15to the set of choices, the two frontiers coincide and we say that there is
spanning.
Let Rt+1 be the vector of the returns of the \sustainable" assets and
rt+1 the vector of the returns of the \conventional" assets. As explained
in Huberman and Kandel (1987) and in De Roon and Nijman (2001), the
starting point of the spanning test is the linear relation
rt+1 = a + BRt+1 + ²t+1 : (6.9)
where a is a N-dimensional vector and B is a N by K matrix.
As shown in De Roon and Nijman (2001), in absence of short-sale con-
straints, spanning implies that the following conditions hold
a = 0; BiK ¡ iN = 0 ; (6.10)
where iK and iN are vectors of ones whose dimensions are respectively K
and N. The test statistic for spanning is hence a Wald statistic that is
asymptotically distributed as a Â2
2N with 2N degrees of freedom.
In the case of short-sale restrictions on the benchmark assets (see De
Roon et al. 2001) one has to divide the frontier of the benchmarks (\sus-
tainable" in our case) in sub-parts and to test spanning for each single part.
The constrained frontier has to be thought as the sum of parts of uncon-
strained frontiers, where each part is built over the subset of assets for which
constraints are not binding. Then the responsible constrained frontier spans
the frontier over the whole set of assets if there is spanning for each single
sub-part. When short-sales are forbidden also for the test (\conventional" in
our case) assets, De Roon et al. (2001) show that to test the spanning for the
generic single sub-part of the frontier corresponds to test that 2N inequal-
ity constraints hold. Suppose we consider the j-th sub-part of the frontier
and let us indicate with R[j] the returns of the subset of assets over which
that part of frontier is computed. Suppose that the size of such a subset is
L[j] < K. Then one should run the regression (6.9) with R[j] as independent
16variables and testing for the following inequality constraints:
a + ´max(BiL ¡ iN) · 0;
a + ´min(BiL ¡ iN) · 0;
(6.11)
where ´min and ´max are the zero beta returns of the portfolios at the edges
of the j-th sub-part of the frontier we are considering (as shown in De Roon
et al. 2001) and the parameters depend on the index [j].
Let us note that the quantity a + ´(BiL ¡ iN) for a generic ´ is nothing
else than the vector of Jensen's alphas of the test assets with respect to the
e±cient portfolio of the L benchmark assets, whose zero-beta return is ´.
The restrictions (6.11) can be tested using a Wald test that in the case
of inequality constraints was studied in Kodde and Palm (1986). The test
statistic, under the null hypothesis is asymptotically distributed as a mixture
of Â2 with 2N degrees of freedom (see De Roon et al. 2001).
Following De Roon et al. (2001) we chose an upper and a lower bound
to the zero beta return of portfolios along the e±cient frontier correspond-
ing to the screened investment universe. We chose the lower bound to be
´ = 0 meaning that investors have the possibility to invest their money in a
risk-free asset with zero net return. The upper bound for ´ is just the return
of the global minimum variance portfolio when short-selling is allowed, cor-
responding to the zero-beta return given by the intercept of the asymptote
to the mean-variance frontier. When short-selling is not allowed the upper
bound has to be computed in order to take into account the e®ect of the
constraints.
The results of spanning test are shown in Table 2 for all levels of screening
and for all sustainability dimensions. We separate the case of allowed short-
selling (columns labeled "ss") from that of short-selling not allowed ("no ss").
The Wald statistic » is reported together with its p-value. If short-selling is
allowed, the null hypothesis of spanning can be rejected in most of the cases.
It means that the e±cient frontier corresponding to the screened portfolios
17and the one obtained over the whole investing universe are signi¯cantly dif-
ferent. For the lowest level of screening the spanning hypothesis is rejected
only for the E dimension. The levels of signi¯cance of the test vary. In
particular the test is highly signi¯cant for the highest levels of screening and
also for the E dimension independently of the level of screening.
When short-selling is not allowed, spanning can not be rejected when the
screening is performed along the S and G dimensions. This means that an
investor who allocates her wealth imposing constraints on the social or corpo-
rate governance performance of the ¯rms, does not improve the performance
of her portfolio by removing the SR constraints. A signi¯cant di®erence is
instead found when the screening is performed along the E dimension even
at medium levels of screening. That is, even though short-selling is not al-
lowed, restricting the investment universe based on environmental scores can
signi¯cantly reduce the performance of the investment.
6.4 Comparison of realized returns
In this subsection we compare the realized returns of the screened and non-
screened portfolios. More precisely, for each level of screening and for each
sustainability dimension we compare the Sharpe ratios computed on the real-
ized returns of the portfolios constructed from the whole investment universe
to the corresponding ratios of portfolios built from screened assets. We per-
form two di®erent tests for the di®erence in the Sharpe ratios. The ¯rst one is
a classical t-test. In order to compare the Sharpe ratios, the realized returns
were ¯rst standardized by local standard deviation estimates11. Then the
expected values of the standardized series of realized returns were compared.
The test revealed no signi¯cant di®erences.
We also implement a robust test for di®erences in the Sharpe ratios,
developed in Ledoit end Wolf (2008). The test is based on a construction
of a studentized bootstrapped con¯dence interval. The test is particularly
11The standard deviations were computed monthly using the observations of the previous
year and an exponential ¯lter with a decay parameter ³ = 0:9.
18appropriate when the returns have heavy tails or when there is some auto-
correlation between the returns or their squares. The method also takes into
account ¯nite sample e®ects. The test is proven to be more robust than other
tests for the di®erence of Sharpe ratio (see for example Jobson and Korkie
1981).
This test con¯rms the results of the previous one: the di®erences in ex-
post Sharpe ratios between the two classes of portfolios are never signi¯cant.
This is not in contrast to the responses of the spanning test, because the
spanning test examine all possible combinations of the portfolios. In fact,
suppose that Sharpe ratios are not very di®erent, but the investment can be
improved by diversi¯cation, then the spanning test would reject the hypoth-
esis of spanning, as it happens for the case of allowed short-selling.
7 Conclusions
We studied the e®ect of several kinds of Social Responsible screening on op-
timal mean-variance portfolios during the period from 1993 to 2008 for ¯rms
belonging to the S&P500 index. The analysis was based on the sustainability
scores provided by KLD, on the variances of the returns estimated by the
Fama-French three factor model and on the expected returns obtained from
the market neutral assumption of the Black-Litterman model.
We observed that the market capitalization eliminated by screening in-
creases with time, because ¯rms with higher capitalization have been lately
raising more concerns, according to the KLD scores, especially in the So-
cial and Governance dimensions. To summarize the e®ects of screening we
observe that 10% partial screening eliminates up to 20% of the market cap-
italization, while the 50% partial screening discharges up to 70% of it. All-
concerns screening may be even stronger: for example, in the year 2007, the
all-concerns screening in the Social dimension eliminates almost 90% of the
market capitalization. In general, Social screening has the strongest impact
in terms of capitalization because it tends to eliminate ¯rms with higher
19market values.
We proposed a measure that we called \price of sustainability", based
on the loss of Sharpe Ratio after the screening. It measures ex-ante, that
is using only information available at the moment of the investment, what
is the e®ect of the screening on optimal portfolio choices. We observed that
the \price of sustainability" is rather small even for large losses in market
capitalization. We analyzed three levels of portfolio risk, which we called
L1, L2 and L3, with L1 representing the minimum risk, L2 the risk of the
market portfolio and L3 the most risky one. We observed that portfolios
at the medium risk level L2 have the smallest sustainability price and that
sustainability prices for L2 and L3 are slightly increasing during the period of
observation. Comparing the three dimensions of sustainability we noted that
the highest sustainability price is associated with the Social dimension, while
the smallest one is obtained by the Environmental dimension, independently
of the level of screening. Screening based on Governance has an intermediate
cost, usually comparable to that based on the Social dimension for higher
levels of screening, and to the Environmental one for smaller levels.
A number of tests were performed to strengthen the credibility of our
results. We checked the robustness of the sustainability price with respect
to estimation error by performing a test based on simulated loading factors
of the three factor model. This test showed that the sustainability prices at
the levels L2 and L3 are robust, while those at level L1 are very sensitive
to input estimates. This explains the higher volatility of the time series of
sustainability prices at level L1.
We compared the screening based on KLD scores to a random rule and
concluded that the screening along the Social dimension excludes a much
larger fraction of market value than any random choice. This is also re-
°ected in the price of sustainability. The ex-post analysis of the realized
returns of socially responsible and of conventional portfolios corresponding
to all risk levels shows that there is not a signi¯cant di®erence in terms
of Sharpe ratios. A spanning test shows that the inclusion of conventional
20portfolios may improve the investment opportunities by diversi¯cation, but
only when short-selling is allowed or, without short-selling, in the case of the
environmental screening.
The general picture emerging from our analysis is that restricting the
investment set for Socially Responsible reasons has a strong e®ect on the
market capitalization structure of the resulting portfolio but implies a small
loss in terms of Sharpe Ratio. From the point of view of a responsible investor
this is good news.
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Figure 1 E®ect of all-concern screening during the period 1992-2007. Top:
percentage of market value discharged by all-concern screenings on the En-
vironmental (solid line), Social (crossed line) and Governance (dotted line)
dimensions. Bottom: number of ¯rms that have not been discharged by the
screening.





































































Figure 2 Percentage of market value eliminated by di®erent levels of partial
screening during the period 1992-2007 on the Environmental (solid line), So-
cial (crossed line) and Governance (dotted line) dimensions. Top: 10% par-
tial screening. Middle: 30% partial screening. Bottom: 50% partial screen-
ing.























Figure 3 Price of sustainability for portfolios at the level of risk L2 for the
all-concern screening on the Environmental (solid line), Social (crossed line)
and Governance (dotted line) dimensions.






















Figure 4 Price of sustainability for portfolios at the level of risk L2 for a
10% partial screening on the Environmental (solid line), Social (crossed line)
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Figure 5 Price of sustainability (top panel) and percentage of Market Value
discharged by screening (bottom panel) for portfolios of type L2. The candles
show the median, the 25-th and the 75-th percentiles of 100 samples obtained
by a 10% random screening. The corresponding values for the non-random
10% partial screening are marked by a circle for the Environment, by a cross
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Figure 6 Test of robustness for the 10% partial screening in the Environ-
mental dimension. The candles represent the median, 25-th and 75-th per-
centiles while the crosses represent outliers of the sustainability prices for
portfolios of type L1 L2 and L3 over 100 simulated scenarios. The circles
correspond to the prices of sustainability of the 10% partial screening in the
Environmental dimension.
27The price of sustainability
L1 L2 L3
mean 95% mean 95% mean 95%
E 1.5 3.6 0.4 0.8 0.2 0.6
10% S 1.9 4.8 0.5 1.1 0.5 1.5
screening G 1.3 2.8 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.7
E 7.3 11.3 0.6 1.1 0.5 1.0
30% S 6.3 11.8 1.0 1.9 1.3 3.2
screening G 7.3 11.4 0.5 1.3 0.8 1.5
E 13.2 18.1 0.7 1.3 0.9 1.6
50% S 11.2 16.8 1.6 2.5 2.9 8.0
screening G 13.2 19.9 0.8 1.7 2.2 5.8
E 8.2 14.9 0.7 1.3 0.4 1.0
all-concerns S 20.1 36.7 2.8 6.4 5.0 12.2
screening G 14.7 36.6 2.8 5.1 4.8 16.7
Table 1 Mean and 95-th percentile of the time series (quarterly observations
from 1993 to 2008) of the price of sustainability, expressed as a percentage,
for di®erent types of screening and di®erent levels of risk. Screening is imple-
mented for the three dimensions of sustainability, Environmental (E), Social
(S) and Governance (G). The risk levels correspond to the global minimum
variance portfolio (L1), the portfolio at the level of the market portfolio (L2)
and a portfolio (L3) symmetric to L1 with respect to the market portfolio.
28Spanning test
E S G
ss no ss ss no ss ss no ss
10% 16.82 6.65 4.00 1.16 8.58 2.80
screening (0.01) (0.12) (0.68) (0.65) (0.20) (0.42)
[***]
30% 37.80 8.53 11.93 1.01 12.06 3.86
screening (0.00) (0.06) (0.06) (0.66) (0.06) (0.30)
[***] [*] [*] [*]
50% 48.36 7.36 24.07 1.58 38.43 3.66
screening (0.00) (0.10) (0.00) (0.57) (0.00) (0.33)
[***] [*] [***] [***]
All-con 52.55 10.56 31.57 1.43 45.57 2.05
screening (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.57) (0.00) (0.50)
[***] [**] [***] [***]
Table 2 Spanning test for di®erent types of screening and sustainability di-
mensions. The table represents the cases of short-selling (ss) and of no short-
selling (no ss). In each case it is reported the Wald statistic » and the p-value
(in parentheses). Rejection of the null hypothesis at the level of 10%, 5% and
1% is labeled by [¤], [¤¤] and [¤ ¤ ¤], respectively.
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